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The scope of politeness – different approaches towards the politeness 
phenomena 
There is little agreement among researchers in the field about what, exactly, 
constitutes politeness and the domain of related research. 
Watts  (1992)  distinguishes  between  social  politeness  and  interpersonal 
politeness  –  tact.  Both  types  of  politeness  –  social  and  interpersonal  –  are 
culturally  acquired,  and  interrelated  in  speech.  Social  politeness  is  rooted  in 
people’s need for smoothly organized interaction with other members of their 
group. Tact is rooted in people’s need to maintain face, in their fear of losing it, 
and in their reluctance to deprive others of it (Goffman 1967). 
The  difference  between  tact  and  social  politeness  is  that  whereas  the 
function of social politeness is essentially to coordinate social interaction – to 
regulate the mechanical exchange of roles and activities – the function of tact is 
quite different: namely to preserve face and regulate interpersonal relationships. 
In fact, it is probably not social politeness that enables people to avoid most 
everyday interpersonal conflicts, but tact. 
Linguistic politeness, in turn, is based on interpersonal politeness. Watts 
(1989) uses the term politic verbal behaviour to cover various realizations of 
linguistic politeness in language usage.  
It  is  very  difficult  to  draw  the  distinction  between  linguistic  and  non-
linguistic politeness as there is a clear interrelation between them.  
The social norm view 
This approach assumes that each society has a particular set of social norms 
consisting of more or less explicit rules that prescribe a certain behaviour, a state  
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of affairs, or a way of thinking in a context. A positive evaluation (politeness) 
arises when an action is in congruence with the norm, a negative evaluation 
(impoliteness) when an action is to the contrary (Fraser 1990). 
The normative view historically considers politeness to be associated with 
speech style, whereby a higher degree of formality implies greater politeness. 
More recently, Quirk et al. (1985:338) reveal the same orientation: 
 […]  The  non-standard  usage  of  ‘Me  and  Mary  are…’  [is]  more  reprehensible,  though 
nonetheless common, if the offending pronoun also violates the rule of politeness which stipulates 
that 1
st person pronouns should occur at the end of the coordinate construction…Another reason 
is that ‘x and I’ is felt to be a polite sequence which can remain unchanged […]. 
It is safe to say that the social-norm approach has few adherents among 
current researchers. 
The conversational-maxim view 
The conversational-maxim perspective relies principally on the work of Grice 
(1975) – his now classic paper ‘Logic and conversation’. In an attempt to clarify 
how  it  is  that  speakers  can  mean  more  than  they  ‘say’,  Grice  argued  that 
conversationalists are rational individuals who are, all other things being equal, 
primarily  interested  in  the  efficient  conveying  of  messages.  To  this  end,  he 
proposed the Cooperative Principle (CP) which postulates that one should say 
what he/she has to say, when he/she has to say it, and the way he/she has to say it.  
Lakoff (1973) was among the first to adopt Grice’s construct of Conversa-
tional Principles in an effort to account for politeness. Unlike Grice, however, 
Lakoff  (1973)  explicitly  extends  the  notion  of  grammatical  rule  and  its 
associated notion of well-formedness to pragmatics: We should like to have some 
kind of pragmatic rules, dictating whether an utterance is pragmatically well-
formed or not, and the extent to which it deviates if it does (Lakoff 1973:296). 
Extending this to the domain of politeness, she considers the form of sentences – 
i.e., specific constructions to be polite or not.  
In her later works she refers to politeness as:  a device used in order to 
reduce friction in personal interaction (Lakoff 1979:64). Lakoff (1973) suggests 
two rules of Pragmatic Competence: (i) Be Clear (essentially Grice’s maxims), 
and (ii) Be Polite. 
She takes these to be in opposition to each other, and notes that they are at 
times reinforcing, at other times in conflict. In addition she posits sub-maxims 
(sub-rules),  adapted  as  follows:  Rule  1:  Don’t  Impose  (used  when 
Formal/Impersonal  Politeness is required),  Rule 2: Give Options (used when 
Informal  Politeness  is  required,  Rule  3:  Make  ‘A’  Feel  Good  (used  when 
Intimate Politeness is required).  
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These  three  rules  are  applicable  more  or  less  depending  on  the  type  of 
politeness  situation  as  understood  by  the  speaker.  For  example,  if  a  speaker 
assesses the situations as requiring Intimate Politeness, window shutting might 
be requested by uttering: ‘Shut the window’, while Informal Politeness might be 
met with ‘Please shut the window’. The reader is never told how the speaker or 
hearer is to assess what level of politeness is required. 
The position of Leech (1983) is a grand elaboration of the Conversational 
Maxim approach to politeness. Like Lakoff, Leech (1983) adopts the framework 
initially set out by Grice: there exists a set of maxims and sub-maxims that guide 
and constrain the conversation of rational people. 
Important  to  Leech’s  theory  is  his  distinction  between  a  speaker’s 
illocutionary goals (what speech act(s) the speaker intends to be conveyed by the 
utterance) and the speaker’s social goals (what position the speaker is taking on 
being truthful, polite, ironic, and the like). In this regard, he posits two sets of 
conversational  (rhetorical)  principles  –  Interpersonal  Rhetoric  and  Textual 
Rhetoric,  each  constituted  by  a  set  of  maxims,  which  socially  constrain 
communicative behavior in specific ways. 
Politeness, never explicitly defined, is treated within the domain of Interper-
sonal Rhetoric, which contains the following first-order principles: those falling 
under the terms of Grice’s Cooperative Principle (CP), those associated with a 
Politeness Principle (PP), those associated with an Interest Principle (IP) and 
Pollyanna Principle. The Interest principle is briefly characterized as: ‘say what 
is unpredictable, and hence interesting’, the Polyanna Principle postulates that 
participants  in  a  conversation  will  prefer  pleasant  topics  of  conversation  to 
unpleasant ones (euphemism is one aspect of this principle).  
Each of these Interpersonal Principles has the same status in his pragmatic 
theory,  with  the  (CP)  and  its  associated  maxims  used  to  explain  how  an 
utterance may be interpreted to convey indirect messages, and the (PP) and its 
maxims used to explain why such indirectness might be used. 
Leech’s Principle of Politeness can be stated as the following: other things 
being equal, minimize the expression of beliefs which are unfavorable to the 
hearer and at the same time (but less important) maximize the expression of 
beliefs which are favorable to the hearer. 
Leech (1983:119) provides a finer differentiation within his principles. He 
proposes six Interpersonal Maxims: 
Tact Maxime: Minimize hearer costs; maximize hearer benefit. 
(Meta Maxim: Do not put others in a position where they have to break the 
Tact Maxim.) 
Generosity Maxime: Minimize your own benefit; maximize your hearer’s 
benefit. 
Approbation Maxime: Minimize hearer dispraise; maximize hearer praise. 
Modesty Maxime: Minimize self-praise; maximize self-dispraise.  
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Agreement Maxime: Minimize disagreement between yourself and others; 
maximize agreement between yourself and others. 
Sympathy  Maxime:  Minimize  antipathy  between  yourself  and  others; 
maximize sympathy between yourself and others. 
Leech  (1983)  distinguishes  between  what  he  calls  ‘Relative  Politeness’, 
which  refers  to  politeness  vis-a-vis  a  specific  situation,  and  ‘Absolute 
Politeness’, which refers to the degree of politeness inherently associated with 
specific speaker actions. Thus, he takes some illocutions (e.g., orders) – and 
presumably the linguistic forms used to effect them – to be inherently impolite, 
and others (e.g., offers) to be inherently polite. 
A modification of Leech’s position, still within the conversational maxim 
perspective, can be found in Kasher (1986) who argues that where there are 
cases in which both the (CP) and (PP) apply, tug-of-war ensures, and what one 
needs is overriding principles of rationality to guide the resolution.  
As has been presented above, Lakoff (1973) considered (CP) to be a subcase 
of the rules of politeness. Leech (1983) claims that (CP) and (PP) are pragmatic 
principles of the first-order, i.e. they are principles of equal linguistic status, 
coordinate and complementary rather than subordinate (of one in relation to the 
other). Despite Leech’s postulate, it must be claimed that the (CP) is always 
basic  because  it  defines  a  norm from which departures are accounted for in 
terms of other principles, e.g. (PP). Furthermore, the maxims of (CP) are valid 
for and may apply to the maxims of (PP) rather than the other way round; which 
seems  to  support  the  view  of  (CP)  as  the  basic  conversational  principle  in 
pragmatics (Kopytko 1993). 
The face-saving view 
Brown  and  Levinson’s  (1987)  method  –  the  face  saving  view  –  is 
constructivism not analysis. Consequently, by constructing a Model Person (MP) 
some aspects of language usage can be accounted for.  
For Brown and Levinson (1987), a Model Person is a willful and fluent 
speaker of a natural language, endowed with two special properties – rationality 
and face. Rationality is to be understood as the availability to the (MP) of a 
mode of reasoning ‘from ends to the means that will achieve those end’. The MP 
is also endowed with face, i.e. with two particular wants: (a) the want to be 
unimpeded (b) the want to be approved of in certain respects. A dyadic model of 
two cooperating MP’s will account for a possible conflict between one MP’s 
face wants and the other’s want to say things that may infringe on those wants. 
Thus, linguistic strategies are derived as: means satisfying communicative and 
face-oriented ends, in a strictly formal system of rational practical reasoning 
(Brown and Levinson (1987:58)).  
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Brown  and  Levinson  (1987)  expect  that  the  function  of  (MP)  may  be 
threefold: (1) as a reference model for the description of culture-specific styles 
of verbal interaction; as a means of characterizing, (2) the ‘ethos’ of a culture 
and subculture, and (3) the affective quality of social relationships. 
Two  characteristic  features  of  Brown  and  Levinson’s  (1987)  approach 
should be pointed out. The first of these is a strictly formal system of rational 
‘practical  reasoning’  and  the  second  –  a  predictive  model.  Those  notions 
unambiguously suggest that Brown and Levinson (1987) view pragmatics as a 
formalized and predicative body of linguistic data in contradistinction to the 
assumptions of the non-categorical and non-modular pragmatics. The concepts 
of  face  and  rationality  are  crucial  to  the  theory  of  politeness.  They  briefly 
summarize their arguments as follows (Brown and Levinson 1987): 
(1) All MPs have positive face and negative face, and all MPs are rational 
agents – i.e. choose means that will satisfy their ends. 
(2) Given that face consists in sets of wants satisfiable only by the actions of 
others, it will in general be to the mutual interest of two MP’s not to threaten 
each other’s face. 
(3) Some acts intrinsically threaten face; these ‘face-threatening acts’ are 
referred to as FTA’ s. 
(4) S (speaker) will want to minimize the face threat of the FTA. 
(5) The greater the risk of an FTA, the more S will want to choose a higher-
numbered strategy (from the set of strategies at his disposal to minimize face 
risk). 
Brown and Levinson (1987) assume that all competent adult members of a 
society have (and know each other to have):  
(i)’face’,  the  public  self  image  that  every  member  wants  to  claim  for 
himself, consisting in two related aspects: 
(a)  negative  face:  the  basic  claims  to  the  territories,  personal  preserves, 
rights  to  non-distraction  –  i.e.  to  freedom  of  action  and  freedom  from 
imposition. 
(b)  positive  face:  the  positive,  consistent  self-image  or  ‘personality’ 
(crucially including the desire for this self – to be appreciated and approved of) 
claimed by interactants. 
(ii) certain rational capacities, in particular consistent modes of reasoning 
from ends to the means that will achieve those ends. 
Brown  and  Levinson  (1987)  adopted  a  reductionist  method  by  reducing 
social facts – some norms of language usage – to the outcome of the rational 
choices of individuals. 
Brown and Levinson (1987) list 15 substrategies of positive politeness and 
10 of negative politeness and say that even these lists are not exhaustive. A 
slightly  simplified  and  modified  version  of  the  substrategies  of  positive 
politeness is presented in Brown and Gilman (1989:167).  
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Brown and Levinsn (1987:102) distinguish fifteen substrategies of positive 
politeness:  1.  Notice,  attended  to  (H) (his interests, wants, needs, goods), 2. 
Exaggerate (interest, approval, sympathy with H), 3. Intensify interest to (H), 4. 
Use in-group identity markers, 5. Seek agreement, 6. Avoid disagreement, 7. 
Presuppose,  raise,  assert  common  ground,  8.  Joke,  9. Assert,  presuppose  S’s 
knowledge of and concern for H’s wants, 10. Offer, promise, 11. Be optimistic, 
12. Include both (S) and (H) in the activity, 13. Give (or ask for) reasons, 14. 
Assume  or  assert  reciprocity,  15.  Give  gifts  to  H  (goods,  sympathy, 
understanding, cooperation). 
The substrategies of negative politeness Brown and Levinson (1987:131) 
include the following: 1. Be conventionally indirect, 2. Question, hedge, 3. Be 
pessimistic, 4. Minimize the imposition FTA, 5. Give deference, 6. Apologize, 7. 
Impersonalize (S) and (H), 8. State the FT A as a general rule, 9. Nominalize, 10. 
Go on record as incurring a debt, or as not indebting (H). 
To conclude, Brown and Levinson view linguistic politeness as a formal, 
deductive and predictive system. As they claim (1987:85), it finds both senses of 
‘generative’  applicable  (i.e.  as  the  image  of  a  dynamo  and  the  quasi-
mathematical sense of precise and explicit description). It is a deductive system 
with axioms and rules of inference (distinct from rules of deductive inference). 
Given a set of goals, one can derive in this system means (i.e. strategies) that 
will achieve those goals. 
Critique of B&L theory of politeness 
The critique of Brown and Levinson’s (1987) theory has been summarized 
in various works (Kasper (1990); Thomas (1995); Escandell-Vidal (1996); Watts 
et al. (1992); Meier (1995)). This section addresses two criticisms that appear to 
be the most important. 
A number of linguists undermine the universality of Politeness Principles. 
This  criticism  seems  to  have  originated  in  Wierzbicka  (1985),  later  to  be 
followed by many others: Kerbrat-Orecchioni (1994), Liao (1994), Janney and 
Arndt  (1993),  Chen  (1993),  Kasper  (1990),  Kasper  and  Blum-Kulka  (1993), 
Blum-Kulka  and  Olshtain  (1984), Wierzbicka  (1991), Watts  et  al. (1992), to 
name a few. 
The  second  criticism  of  B&L  is  that  their  distinction  between  negative 
politeness and positive politeness is dubious (Meier 1995:384). This problem, 
according  to  Meier  (1995:385),  has  arisen  from  the  fact  that  Brown  and 
Levinson categorize many FTA’s as threatening both negative and positive face. 
Moreover, Kopytko (1993) views Brown and Levinson’ s theory as a system 
in which the concepts such as face, rationality, reductionism and context are 
vague and indeterminate in nature, thus, it would be wishful thinking to claim  
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that it is possible, at least theoretically, to formulate a deterministic theory based 
on those notions. A more realistic view, and still very ambitious, would be to 
claim  that  pragmatic  phenomena  (including  linguistic  politeness)  although, 
clearly,  indeterministic  in  character,  achieve  some  kind  of  ‘probabilistic 
tendency’, especially, when analyzed as the properties of speech communities 
rather than those of individual speakers (Kopytko 1993). 
Culpeper  (1996)  attempts  to  build  an  impoliteness  framework  which  is 
parallel but opposite to Brown and Levinson’ s (1987) theory of politeness. Each 
of  Brown  and  Levinson’s  (1987)  politeness  superstrategies  has  its  opposite 
impoliteness super-strategy. They are opposite in terms of orientation to face. 
Instead  of  enhancing  or  supporting  face,  impoliteness  superstrategies  are  a 
means of attacking face. 
Chen (2001) proposes a model of self-politeness theory which is an addition 
to  Brown  and  Levinson’s theory. In other words, it fills a void left by their 
approach so that the theory of politeness becomes complete. Thus, the theory of 
politeness  is  a  kind  of  dichotomy:  other-politeness  and  self-politeness.  To 
postulate this, however, Chen (2001) offers a defense of Brown and Levinson’ s 
framework, arguing that their theory is fundamentally correct and is still the best 
tool in the investigation of politeness – as an analytical tool rather than as a 
dogmatic picture of reality. 
The conversational-contract view 
The fourth approach to politeness is that presented by Fraser (1975), Fraser 
and Nolen (1981). While also adopting Grice’s notion of a Cooperative Principle 
in its general sense (as quoted above), and while recognizing the importance of 
Goffman’s (1967) notion of face, this approach differs in certain important ways 
from that of Brown and Levinson’s (1987). 
In the conversational-contract view each party brings into a conversation an 
understanding of some initial set of rights and obligations that will determine, at 
least for the preliminary stages, what the participants can expect from the other(s). 
During the course of time, or because of a change in the context, there is always 
the possibility for a renegotiation of the conversational contract: the two parties 
may readjust just what rights and what obligations they hold towards each other. 
The  dimensions  on  which  interactive  participants  establish  rights  and 
obligations  vary  greatly.  Some  terms  of  a  conversational  contract  may  be 
imposed  through  convention;  they  are  of  a  general  nature  and  apply  to  all 
ordinary  conversations.  Speakers,  for  example,  are  expected  to  take  turns 
(subject to the specific constraints of that sub-culture), they are expected to use a 
mutually intelligible language, to speak sufficiently loudly for the other to hear 
clearly, and to speak seriously. These are seldom negotiable.  
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Communication of politeness within the Relevance theory, proposed by Jary 
(1998),  is  based  on  the  views  on  politeness  advocated  by  Fraser  (1990). 
According to Fraser, politeness is more often anticipated than communicated. 
That  is,  the  Brown  and  Levinson  (1987)  view  is  counterintuitive  in  that  it 
predicts  that  whenever  the  so-called  polite  forms/strategies  are  used  then  an 
additional  layer  of  meaning  is  necessarily  communicated,  while  people’s 
experience as conversationalists proves that polite forms often go unnoticed by 
the participants. To say that politeness is anticipated is, in relevance theoretic 
terms,  to  say  that  communicators  enter  a  linguistic  exchange  with  mutually 
manifest assumptions about what is permissible in terms of force and content. 
Fraser (1990:234) also notes that the basis for Brown and Levinson’s view 
of politeness as a message – Grice’s Cooperative Principle and his Maxims of 
Conversation – have been challenged by Spreber and Wilson’s (1986) relevance 
theoretic account of utterance interpretation. 
Jary’s (1998) account of politeness within the Relevance theory framework 
consists  in  factoring  out  of  Brown  and  Levinson’s  (1987)  model  only  those 
assumptions that are incompatible with relevance theory: speech act theory and 
the norm based approach to communication.  
Conclusion 
It seems clear that a viable theory of politeness cannot rest upon a set of 
rules based on social, normative behavior. What one views as polite or impolite 
behavior in normal interaction is subject to immediate and unique contextually-
negotiated factors, thus the normative perspective should be rejected. 
Finally, inasmuch as the Brown and Levinson’s (1987) approach is the most 
fully  articulated  version,  it  seems  clearly  the  one  to  be  systematically 
challenged. For example, can what counts as ‘face’ be defined within a culture? 
Is there sound empirical evidence that their claims about the use of politeness 
strategies correlate with naturally occurring conversations? To what extent is 
there persuasive evidence that their levels (degrees) of politeness are viewed 
consistently by native speakers of a language? To what extent is what they take 
as indirectness in performance a function of a speaker’s intention of politeness?  
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